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Critics of globalization view the free flow of
capital as economically destabilizing and advocate
capital controls for four main reasons: controls
are intended to guard against volatility, prevent
financial contagion, enable infant financial indus-
tries to develop in domestic markets, and be an
effective measure of last resort that gives govern-
ments room in which to breathe while they pur-
sue needed reforms.
However, the empirical record does not sup-
port the beliefs of proponents of capital controls.
Protecting domestic financial markets and imped-
ing capital flows have often exacerbated financial
crises and caused contagion. Controls are invari-
ably used for protectionist purposes rather than
development and to delay reform. Most impor-
tant, free capital flows, like free trade, dramatical-
ly improve a country’s prospects for development. 
Malaysia, the only country to resort to exten-
sive capital controls in the midst of the Asian
financial crisis in 1998, did not benefit from those
drastic measures. Malaysia’s restrictions were
instituted more than a year after the outbreak of
the Asian crisis and after the ringgit had fallen by
34 percent and the bulk of capital flight had taken
place. Repealed in May 2001, the controls were
used more as a shield for a corrupt government
and a means of denying economic liberty than as
a remedy for Malaysia’s woes. Unlike other coun-
tries in crisis in the region, moreover, Malaysia has
had difficulty attracting foreign direct investment.
Developing countries would be better served
by addressing the real causes of financial turmoil.
Specifically, countries should fix their unsound
banking systems by opening their financial sec-
tors to foreign competition, eliminate govern-
ment guarantees against bank failures, create
independent central banks, and move away from
pegged exchange rates and toward floating or
fully fixed exchange-rate regimes. 
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Introduction
The World Trade Organization ministeri-
al meeting in Seattle in December 1999 and
the protests against the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in April
and September 2000 have focused the
world’s attention on globalization: the
increasing movement of goods and services
across national boundaries and the contin-
ued integration of the world’s financial mar-
kets. The riots and protests that accompa-
nied the meetings were intended to create in
developed nations a backlash against free
markets. Pressure groups, such as environ-
mentalists and labor unions, with an interest
in slowing trade liberalization stepped up
their attacks. The anti-globalization move-
ment, which claims that free trade continues
to impoverish developing countries, has
recently been taken more seriously by the
press and international organizations, as evi-
denced by the dialogue attempted by policy-
makers at the World Economic Forum in
January 2001 and the “shadow” meetings in
Porto Alegre, Brazil.
Coupled with the attacks on free trade are
more insidious calls to reverse or stanch the
free flow of capital. While the movement of
goods is highly visible and provides its own
constituency in favor of increasing openness,
the everyday movement of capital is less evi-
dent to the public at large, becoming visible
only in the event of a crash, as was the case
with the Asian crisis of 1997–98. Blamed for
excessive volatility, capital movements have
been scapegoated by pundits and policymak-
ers alike as the external cause of recession.1
“Hot money” and external finance, instead of
being an outstretched hand to pull nations
out of poverty, suddenly became the hand
that held down the developing world. Indeed,
Malaysia’s prime minister Mahathir bin
Mohamad blamed multimillionaire busi-
nessman George Soros and an unnamed con-
spiracy of financiers for bringing down the
ringgit in 1997 and instituted controls on
capital flows into and out of his nation.
Those controls were repealed in May 2001.
Although every crisis seems to spark calls
for some closing of the world trading and
financial system, the Asian crisis of 1997–98
afforded a chance to compare the effects dif-
ferent policies on capital flows across the
region. Only Malaysia instituted capital con-
trols in an attempt to reduce investment in
that country. And Malaysia’s seeming success
in closing its capital markets, coupled with
their reopening in May 2001, has sparked a
revival of interest in the use of capital con-
trols and made them credible to some inter-
national economic policymakers.2
The fundamental deficiencies of capital
controls have not been overcome, and
reliance on those measures continues to dis-
tract attention from the causes of the prob-
lems they are supposed to redress. Capital
controls perpetuate inefficiencies, create
vested interests in their continuance, and
doom economies to second-tier status. For
emerging markets, restrictions on the flow of
money are especially inauspicious, for, as
Alan Reynolds of the Hudson Institute has
commented, it is difficult to have “capitalism
without capital.”3 At heart, though, the case
against capital controls goes beyond efficien-
cy and relates directly to economic choice
and individual freedom. Does a government
have the right to deny citizens the ability to
move their funds around as they wish?
Because they deny efficiency and equity, cap-
ital controls remain a policy instrument
doomed to failure.
Capital and Its Discontents
The world has enjoyed an unprecedented
economic boom over the past decade: the
United States, despite a recent slowdown, has
enjoyed nearly 10 years of undiluted eco-
nomic expansion. Trade among countries
has burgeoned since the end of the Cold War:
the value of trade in goods and services grew
annually by 7 percent from 1990 to 1998.
Regional growth has been even higher: Latin
America saw the value of its trade increase by
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14 percent and Central and Eastern Europe
saw theirs grow by 12 percent annually over
the period 1990–98.4
The keys to that boom are manifold and
can be traced to the wave of deregulation and
privatization begun in the 1980s, coupled
with advances in technology. The collapse of
the Soviet Union and the rush to democracy
have also played a large part in the trade
explosion. But the sustaining power for the
boom, the underlying factor, is the increased
movement of capital and the ability of
financiers to cross national boundaries and
take advantage of investment opportunities
across the globe.5
Notwithstanding oscillations, the explo-
sion of international finance and the move-
ment of capital (Table 1) mirror the boom in
trade over the past decade, and with good
reason: capital investment across borders is
3
Table 1
Net Capital Flows to All Emerging Markets (billions of dollars)
Type of Inflow 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
All emerging markets
Total net private capital 112.6 172.1 136.3 226.9 215.9 147.6 75.1 80.5 154.1 166
Net FDI 35.4 59.4 84 92.6 113.2 138.6 143.3 149.8 128.2 130.5
Net portfolio investment 56.1 84.4 109.6 36.9 77.8 52.9 8.5 23.3 22.3 22.7
Bank loans and other 21 28.3 –57.3 97.4 24.9 –44.0 –76.7 –92.5 3.6 12.8
Africa
Total net private capital –4.0 –1.8 2.9 10.9 7.5 16.7 11.5 14.8 7.3 10.4
Net FDI 0.6 1.9 2.3 2.2 4.8 7.4 5.2 9.5 5.1 5.6
Net portfolio investment 1.8 1 2 1.4 1.3 3.7 4.3 4.4 1 2
Bank loans and other –6.4 4.7 –1.4 7.3 1.4 5.6 2 0.9 1.2 2.8
Asia
Total net private capital 20.8 57.4 63.6 104.9 104.1 –1.4 –42.6 –27.0 49.4 52
Net FDI 15.7 33.9 47.1 46.6 53.1 55.5 58.3 49.9 49.9 50
Net portfolio investment 9 21.8 11.8 14.2 12.9 3.5 –17.9 –5.6 14.9 11.6
Bank loans and other –3.9 1.7 4.7 44.1 38.1 –60.4 –82.9 –71.3 -15.3 -9.5
Five Asian economiesa
Total net private capital 29 31.8 36.1 74.2 65.8 –20.4 –25.6 –24.6 -3.8 1.9
Net FDI 7.3 7.6 8.8 7.5 8.4 10.3 8.6 10.2 n/a n/a
Net portfolio investment 6.4 17.2 9.9 17.4 20.3 12.9 –6.0 6.3 n/a n/a
Bank loans and other 15.3 7 17.4 49.2 37.1 –43.6 –28.2 –41.1 n/a n/a
Latin America
Total net private capital 55.6 66.8 49.4 53.1 72.1 85.5 70 54.1 67.5 64.9
Net FDI 13.9 13.4 23.1 24.7 39.5 53.1 56.1 63.6 55.4 51.2
Net portfolio investment 30.3 44 66.7 3 41 19.2 14.7 10.6 6.3 7.8
Bank loans and other 11.4 9.4 –40.4 25.5 –8.4 13.2 –0.8 –20.1 5.8 5.9
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets (Washington: IMF Press, 2000), p. 46.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; n/a = not available.
aSouth Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
really just a form of intertemporal trading,
placing money in investments that will pay
off tomorrow rather than today. Cross-bor-
der intertemporal trading, which benefits
from policy and institutional differences
between nations, takes advantage of the stat-
ic comparative advantages of current market
conditions and helps to fund the advantages
of tomorrow.
The free flow of capital, as much as or
more than the free flow of goods and ser-
vices, benefits from (and follows) sound
macroeconomic policy and functioning
institutions. Developing nations enjoyed a
tremendous surge in capital inflows during
the 1990s, with total flows in 1997 alone
equaling $295.1 billion (of which $53 billion
was portfolio investment).6 Most of the capi-
tal has been concentrated in about a dozen
countries, mainly those that the markets
thought had continued growth prospects
(Figure 1).
However, economic fundamentals in
much of the emerging world were still far
from sound in the second half of the 1990s.
Adherence to pegged exchange rates and
unsound banking systems, coupled with
rampant government corruption and a belief
in government’s ability to allocate resources
better than the market, led directly to the
Asian crisis of 1997–98 and the subsequent
crises in Russia and Brazil. Institutions that
were created during the Cold War and tai-
lored to another time proved wholly unsuit-
able to the brisk pace of international
finance, and countries with centrally mis-
managed economies were left behind by the
market.7
The lack of confidence in emerging mar-
kets manifested itself as capital flight;
investors withdrew their money from East
Asia (initially) and then from other shaky
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Figure 1
Concentration of Net Private Capital Flows, Selected Developing Countries, 1990–97
Source: Alejandro Lopez-Mejia, “Large Capital Flows: A Survey of Causes, Consequences, and Policy
Responses,” IMF Working Paper WP/99/17. Used with permission of Lopez-Mejia.
economies, leading to a swing in 1997 of
$105 billion in the East Asian economies
alone; $77 billion of that money came from
commercial bank lending and $24 billion
from portfolio lending.8
In response to that turnaround, Malaysia
took a step against financial freedom and
imposed capital controls in September 1998.
Malaysia’s experience is instructive for the
future of emerging markets because it repre-
sents an attempt by a state to wrest control
from the amorphous power of “globaliza-
tion”—a throwback to the days of the Cold
War, when East Asia’s state-directed capital-
ism was touted as the new paradigm of eco-
nomic development. 
Types of Controls
Capital controls have long been a part of
the political landscape. In the rollback of the
liberal international economic order that
occurred after World War I, Nazi Germany
was one of the first countries to use capital
controls as a deliberate instrument of eco-
nomic policy; a comprehensive set of
exchange and capital restrictions was put in
place in 1934 by Hitler’s economics minister,
Hjalmar Schacht, to “restrict the movement
of currencies or specie across national bor-
ders.”9 The Soviet Union was also notorious
for its state control of trade and finances, and
an arcane array of capital controls was used
to stem foreign investment (or to channel it
into sectors and industries in accord with the
Central Committee’s plans). 
Fascism and communism were not the
only worldviews that regarded capital con-
trols as a viable policy. John Maynard Keynes
argued, “Flexible exchange rates and free
international capital mobility are incompati-
ble with global full employment and rapid
economic growth in an era of multilateral
free trade.”10 Indeed, controls were a normal
part of government intervention; duties
imposed by them were used to “maintain a
tax base to finance wartime expenditures”;11
the founding charter of the IMF explicitly
recognizes the right of countries to impose
capital controls. 
There is often confusion about what
exactly constitutes a capital control; indeed,
different countries use different policy
instruments as checks on the flow of capital.
For the purposes of this paper, “capital con-
trols” refers to government attempts to limit
either the composition or the size of foreign
investment by controlling either price
(through taxes) or quantity (through quotas)
and to restrictions on citizens’ or foreign
investors’ taking money out of a country.
While very few nations have in place the
draconian controls that were in place before
the fall of communism (such as an incon-
vertible national currency or laws against car-
rying foreign exchange), many developing
nations still have some checks on the unfet-
tered movement of capital. According to the
IMF, by the end of 1996, 144 of a total of 186
countries had controls on direct investment,
128 countries controlled transactions in cap-
ital market securities, and 112 countries reg-
ulated trade in money market instruments.12
Chile, often touted as the shining example of
how capital controls can work (and the
model for Malaysia’s controls), had two dif-
ferent experiences with impeding capital
flows in 1978–82 and 1990–98. The first set
of controls was an extensive and bewildering
array of restrictions that heavily penalized
short-term investments. That experiment
ended in the collapse of the peso in 1982; a
domestic banking crisis and the concurrent
failures of other Latin American currencies
also contributed to the collapse. 
The second set of Chilean controls, institut-
ed in 1990, was milder, yet it still attempted to
skew the composition of capital flowing into
the country from short term to long term.
Chile’s controls used a nonremunerated reserve
requirement that forced investors to deposit a
proportion of their funds (between 10 and 30
percent) with the central bank—“a tax that was
virtually confiscatory when applied to very
short-term funds.”1 3 The reserve requirement
was independent of the maturity of the invest-
ment. Moreover, for foreign direct investment
(FDI), the central bank had a “minimum stay”
requirement of one year.14
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Chile’s second experience with capital
controls used the policy instrument most
often advocated by opponents of the free
flow of capital, a tax on capital that will
change the composition of investments flow-
ing into a country. The prototype of that con-
trol was the “Tobin tax,” named after Yale
University economist and Nobel laureate
James Tobin, who first suggested throwing
“grains of sand” into the cogs of the financial
machinery to discourage speculation and
encourage long-term investment.15 That tax,
much like Chile’s, would take a small per-
centage of the value of all foreign exchange
transactions, thus reducing (or eliminating)
the profit margin on very small and short-
term investments. In the wake of the Asian
debacle, many pundits have called for the
global institution of the Tobin tax.16 Still
others claim that a Tobin tax is not large
enough to deal with the growth of capital
movements: boulders are needed in the cogs,
not grains of sand.1 7
Although the current round of debates on
capital controls has focused more on inflows
than on outflows,1 8the real fear in emerging
markets is that money invested in a country
will suddenly be withdrawn in a frenzy of
capital flight, leading to a collapse of the
banking and financial systems. Malaysia’s
capital controls, based on Chile’s, were
designed to limit mobility and prevent short-
term investments, but in reality they were
much more oppressive. They banned trans-
fers between domestic and foreign accounts
and between foreign accounts; eliminated
use of credit facilities by offshore parties; pre-
vented repatriation of investment until
September 1, 1999; and fixed the exchange
rate of the ringgit at 3.8 per dollar.19
Why Controls?
Proponents of capital controls rely on
four arguments:
1. Controls are a bulwark against volatility.
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia artic-
ulated that view in a particularly blunt
form when he said: “I feel that we need sta-
bility for the world’s economies. There is
no harm in having some kind of mecha-
nism for fixing the exchange rates, so that
there is not too violent a swing in the
exchange rates. It’s not going to harm any-
body. The only people who may not bene-
fit from it may be a few people who deal
with the currency. The rest of the world
will benefit. So why are we protecting these
people? Why are they so important that
they are not transparent, that they are not
regulated?”2 0This argument assumes that
controls can prevent the dramatic reversals
in capital flows that accompanied the
Asian crisis of 1997–98.
2. Controls prevent contagion. (This is a sis-
ter of the volatility argument.) Capital con-
trols can insulate an economy against
financial panic in neighboring or regional
economies.2 1
3. Controls protect infant financial markets.
The institutional arrangements of devel-
oping nations are frequently fragile and
not proficient in dealing in the hectic
world of international finance. Offering
shelter from speculators will allow those
institutions time to mature and gain
financial savvy.2 2
4. Controls are effective as a temporary last
resort; they can buy governments the time
needed to get their macroeconomic houses
in order. A major component of this argu-
ment cites the need to keep a stable
exchange rate, in the belief that runs on the
currency will keep out investment in the
long run and irreparably damage a coun-
try’s prospects for long-term economic
growth (through skyrocketing interest rates
or hyperinflation).2 3
The theoretical underpinning of most of
those arguments, however, flows from the
old mercantilist principle that trade in goods
or capital is a zero-sum game and that invest-
ment kept inside a country is a “winner,”
whereas investment that leaves a country
causes a loss. That belief is as erroneous when
applied to capital as it is when applied to
goods and services.
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The Problems with Controls
Volatility is often cited as the greatest
threat to a fragile stock market or emerging
economy, and short-term capital flows that
can easily be pulled from an economy are the
bogeyman of emerging markets. “Hot
money” has become the derogatory term for
short-term capital movements, and people
who deal in those investments are derided as
“speculators.” Unlike FDI, which is looked
upon favorably because of the tangible assets
(such as factory or job creation) it provides,
short-term investments are often deemed
unproductive and even harmful because they
are highly liquid and can be shifted rapidly. 
However, various forms of investment—
whether short term, long term, or in FDI
form—tend to have the same generally posi-
tive effects on growth. A landmark study in
1998 examined 18 emerging markets and
their experiences from the 1970s to 1994,
comparing the effects of FDI and portfolio
equity flows on the countries’ growth.24
While FDI had “the most pronounced posi-
tive impact” on growth, “perhaps more sur-
prising . . . the changes in the share of portfo-
lio equity capital inflows to GDP also have a
significant positive relation to subsequent
GDP growth.”25 The positive impact of all
forms of investment has been constant over
the past 30 years, even as direct bank lending
to governments (but not bank lending to pri-
vate firms in emerging markets) has declined
in importance and portfolio investment and
FDI have skyrocketed.
With capital bringing benefits to emerg-
ing markets, what happens when that capital
is suddenly redistributed or withdrawn?
Empirical research on the impact of capital
flight is starting to burgeon, and recent
scholarship refutes claims that investment
swings are deleterious for an economy. A
recent paper examined the behavior of for-
eign investors in Korea during the Asian cri-
sis. The authors relied on daily data from
November 1996 through the last day of trad-
ing in 1997. Korea’s stock market was thor-
oughly pummeled by the events in the
region; a dollar invested in the market on
October 1, 1997, would have been worth only
35 cents at the end of the last trading day a
little less than three months later.26 But was
foreign capital the destabilizing force? Did
international capital and “herding” con-
tribute to excessive volatility? 
Apparently not, according to that study of
the Korean stock market. It found that “the
impact of domestic buying on stock returns
dominates the impact of foreign selling.
During the last three months of 1997, days
with large foreign net selling do not have sig-
nificant market-adjusted returns . . . there is
therefore no convincing evidence that for-
eign investors play a destabilizing role.”2 7The
researchers even controlled for the presence
of price floors in the Korean stock market
(Korea’s stock exchange has rules similar to
those of the American Stock Exchange, trig-
ger mechanisms that will not allow a stock’s
price to fall more than 8 percent in one day).
It was hypothesized that any stock that fell
the maximum amount in one day would con-
tinue to fall the next day, adding to a herd
effect. But the nondestabilizing effect of for-
eign investments held even after controlling
for price floors, and volatility was not exacer-
bated by external capital.28
With excessive volatility discounted as a
direct result of liberalization, it is important to
note the stabilizing effects that capital flows
have on an economy. For an emerging nation,
liberalization is its own reward. International
asset-pricing models used by financiers hold
that liberalizing financial markets and capital
flows will reduce the liberalizing country’s cost
of equity capital by allowing for risk sharing by
domestic and foreign agents. Domestic volatili-
ty, a factor in developing markets because of
their inexperience in finance and shaky political
situations, can be hedged against in foreign
markets, to some extent insulating the markets
from systemic risk. Recent empirical work in
this area, done by Peter Henry of the Stanford
Business School, confirms that stock market
liberalizations raise equity index numbers in the
run-up to liberalization. Furthermore, the free
7
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movement of capital should lead to “an increase
in physical investment following . . . liberaliza-
tion, because a fall in the country’s cost of equi-
ty capital will transform some investment proj-
ects that had a negative net present value before
liberalization into positive NPV [net present
value] endeavors after liberalization.”29 In a
study released in 1998, the WTO touted the sta-
bilization benefits of liberalization, noting not
only that financial gains had been reaped by lib-
eralizing countries but also that financial sta-
bility had been greatest in countries that
opened services to wide competition.30
Ironically, capital controls themselves are
a main precipitant of increased volatility, as
they favor risk-seeking investors at the
expense of risk-averse ones (the exact out-
come that the controls mean to reverse).
Capital controls are essentially a government
guarantee that investors who have taken on
excessive international risk in the past (and
may be affected by a global financial down-
turn) will have some of their risk mitigated
by government fiat. Thus, controls engender
what is known as moral hazard—instead of
encouraging more prudent lending practices
and avoiding the volatility that international
flows supposedly engender, controls lend a
shield that lets risk-seeking investors take on
greater internal risk.
The Contagion Argument
One of the most highly touted arguments
in favor of capital controls is that they sup-
posedly impart a positive externality: by
catching a financial crisis at its inception in
one country, they can reduce the spread of
the crisis to neighboring countries. As the
IMF stated in its quarterly journal Finance
and Development, “As the financial crises that
struck . . . during the second half of 1997 . . .
have amply demonstrated, financial global-
ization also carries very large risks, because
instability in one country can now spread
almost instantly to others.”31 Indeed, the
wave of crises that struck in 1997–98 seemed
to be the result of the feeling that emerging
markets were suddenly a bad investment and
it was time to switch to safer investments.
Capital controls are thus supposedly a way to
dampen the enthusiasm of investors and let
them return to their senses.
Far from acting like sheep, however,
investors often behave in a very rational man-
ner when a currency crisis hits. The trigger
mechanism for contagion is information,
not too much of it but a dearth of it. Markets
thrive on information, reflected in the price
of resources and equity, and when those price
signals are wrong because of incomplete
information in emerging markets, the result
is suboptional investments. However, as new
information becomes available, investors
adjust accordingly.3 2Without information to
the contrary from other markets, new infor-
mation obtained in one country is often
assumed to be applicable to other countries
that share the same apparent market charac-
teristics, causing a so-called contagion effect.
Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank
in New York have modeled that phenome-
non. Asserting that inflows at the country
level are highly volatile, they argue that
“incomplete information and the subse-
quent process of learning . . . can generate
high volatility” above and beyond any nor-
mal emerging-market jitters.3 3 As informa-
tion becomes readily available, however,
volatility becomes “less acute over time.”34
Investors think that “events in one emerging
country provide information about other
countries. Thus, a very low return in one
country will lead to a decline in the subjective
probability [that controls will not be
imposed] but it will also lead to declines in
other countries.”3 5 The extent of this conta-
gion will probably depend on regional fac-
tors: “For example, a regional shock in
Thailand may provide more information (in
the eyes of investors) about other Southeast
Asian countries than a shock in Mexico.”36
In addition, laissez faire policies can pro-
vide benefits and let adjustment mechanisms
filter out contagion naturally. Singapore,
blamed for some of Malaysia’s troubles,
seemed to be a prime target for contagion,
given its small size and historical ties to
Malaysia. Yet the country was only peripher-
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ally hit by the Asia debacle and, as of
February 2001, was posting growth rates of
9.9 percent over the previous year.37
Singapore recovered quickly from the Asian
crisis, more quickly even than Hong Kong
(which uncharacteristically intervened in its
stock market in 1997), traditionally a stal-
wart of laissez faire capitalism whose growth
has been slowed by integration with China.38
Not coincidentally, one of the reasons for
Singapore’s buoyancy is that the city-state
was one of the most global-oriented
economies in East Asia: A. T. Kearney
Consulting places Singapore at the top of its
“globalization index” as the most integrated
economy in the world in 1998.3 9 Familiar
with dealing in the world’s financial markets
and open to the world market, Singapore was
able to function as a pass-through for the
contagion that swept the area and suffered
very little itself. 
Old-School Trade Policy
Another argument often trotted out in
favor of capital controls mirrors the “infant
industry” arguments that were promulgated
in the 1950s and 1960s to justify protection-
ism on the grounds that international com-
petition would savage fledgling domestic
companies. Capital controls now supposedly
have the same beneficial effect, helping
financial markets in emerging economies to
survive the onslaught of competition and
develop into mature intermediaries. Capital
controls are thus a way to erect indirect trade
barriers without resorting to blanket tariffs
or quotas (and thus drawing the ire of the
WTO). No matter how controls are justified,
however, they remain an insidious form of
industrial policy that can be used to keep out
foreign competition while subsidizing and
protecting domestic financial services. 
Industrial policy was all the rage in the
1980s in the wave of the “Asian miracle,” as
pundits and policymakers alike applauded
the ability of the Japanese and Korean gov-
ernments to “pick winners” and subsidize
them appropriately.4 0 Debates about “Asian
values” and the importance of a tight-knit
relationship between business and govern-
ment filled the policy stream, and elaborate
models were trotted out to justify govern-
ment action as a way to overcome “coordina-
tion failures” that precluded the markets
from allocating resources efficiently.4 1But, as
the experience of East Asia in the 1990s
shows, industrial policy cannot “pick win-
ners” any better than an individual can pick
lottery numbers. Japan’s malaise over the
past decade shows that “Japan needs to aban-
don the very elements of the old ‘Japan, Inc.’
system [i.e. industrial policy] that [were] sin-
gled out as its greatest strengths.”4 2Favoring
one industry to the detriment of another
inherently distorts the economy, and no ten-
able argument can be made that a nation
accepts that distortion in exchange for pro-
duction of steel (or wool, or whatever). 
Even though trade protectionism has
been discredited in theory and practice, capi-
tal controls have become another way for
governments to meddle in their economies
to favor domestic-oriented industries over
export-oriented ones. Controls favor banks
that lend primarily in the domestic sector
(which is more dangerous than lending inter-
nationally because of larger domestic risk,
greater susceptibility to domestic policy
changes, and lack of access to liquidity) over
those that diversify their risks internationally
and favor domestic investors (whose primary
source of capital is those same fragile domes-
tic banks that are liquidity deficient). Finally,
capital controls are a major impediment to
trade in goods and services, reducing exports
to developing countries as well as starving
exporters of needed capital.4 3
By imposing capital controls, govern-
ments are doing much more than perpetuat-
ing economic inefficiencies in their coun-
tries; they are also distorting information
and preventing learning. As happened under
the protectionist trade regimes of the middle
of the 20th century, the protected financial
markets become addicted to the protection,
and their ability to function in the interna-
tional marketplace in the future is impaired.
It is only through functioning on their own
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and making mistakes that domestic financial
markets gain institutional knowledge; shel-
tered from any failures, banks and stock mar-
kets will not learn to behave competitively
and effectively, which makes any crash more
severe. As an Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development report noted,
“There is plenty of evidence to show that as
markets and institutions mature, the effi-
ciency and regulatory gains arising from the
liberalization of capital movements out-
weigh the risks.”44
Indeed, the repeated mistakes of financial
intermediaries lead to more efficient mar-
kets. As a former World Bank economist
noted, “Looking at the response of Latin
America to the crises in the early 1980s and
again to the Tequila crisis of 1994–95, we are
of the view that countries normally draw pos-
itive lessons from crisis management.”45
Under the guise of protection, capital con-
trols impose a learning moratorium on
domestic financial intermediaries.
A Little Breathing Room
Economic systems are based on institu-
tions, and fashioning an effective institutional
structure to take advantage of the depth and
breadth of international capital markets is a
prerequisite to capital account liberalization.
As the theory of the “second best” would pre-
dict, removing one distortion to an economy
(e.g., exchange controls and capital restric-
tions) may actually decrease welfare if the
economy is riddled with other distortions.46
Thus, reform of financial institutions so they
can handle capital flows is an important part
of the process of global integration. 
What happens after liberalization is effect-
ed, however, and the country in question runs
into a crisis? Are controls then available to
help the country weather the storm?
Proponents of controls claim that they are a
temporary solution, a Band-Aid that buys gov-
ernments time to put their houses in order.
Indeed, that has been the leading claim by
Paul Krugman, the economist who single-
handedly resurrected the credibility of con-
trols.47 Given that tackling the fundamentals
is a long-term problem, capital controls would
seem to be a short-term answer to an immedi-
ate fiscal crisis.
Chile and Malaysia are again presented as
the new, defining cases for temporary capital
controls. But listening to Mahathir makes
one question the “temporary” nature of
those controls:
We keep [capital controls] there until
the world’s financial system is adjust-
ed. We have said that from the very
beginning. We will keep the controls
on until the world makes sure that
they regulate currency trading and this
very rapid flow of capital, which is
damaging to a lot of countries.48
As the investment firm CLSA Global
Emerging Markets aptly noted, “The reason
[the] solution of exchange controls . . . is so
dangerous is that [Paul Krugman] has no
conception of the capacity of some of the
leaders in Asia for self-delusion.”49 Mahathir’s
belief that confining his economy to the sec-
ond tier will bring around the world smacks
terribly of cutting off his people’s nose to
spite his own face. Moreover, Mahathir’s defi-
ant siege mentality confirms the real reason
for imposing controls: far from granting a bit
of space that countries can use to carve out
independent policies while they reform, con-
trols are invariably used as a substitute for
reform.
Capital markets impose rigid checks on
bad policies, and controls often attempt to
shield governments from those checks. In
some cases, where there is little or no integra-
tion with the world, controls do, indeed,
shield governments—at the cost of growth
and trade. But can controls work for coun-
tries that are even moderately involved in the
world’s financial system?
Efficacy
Given the shortcomings of capital controls,
perhaps the strongest argument against them
is their basic inefficacy. Although some com-
mentators claim that capital controls do not
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produce any long-term hazards for an econo-
my,50 controls must be judged on their explic-
it goals. Among the most important is stem-
ming perceived volatility. Here, as elsewhere,
controls are less than effective. Even when
controls are truly a temporary policy, once
they are lifted, they create even more volatility.
Capital markets tend to be conservative, and a
country that has imposed controls in the past
will be automatically expected to impose them
again. The use of controls can thus skew the
composition of capital toward the very short
term, or crowd out badly needed capital alto-
gether for a long time. As several financiers
noted shortly after Malaysia’s imposition of
controls, those policies would turn Malaysia
into “an equity black hole” and make
“Malaysia virtually uninvestable.”5 1 Even
Chile, the poster child for “temporary” capital
controls, had problems. Its reserve require-
ment created uncertainty in capital markets,
and, according to Chilean economist Salvador
Valdes, “The threat that the tax might be reim-
posed is keeping banks and brokers from
investing in stockbrokerages in Chile, because
their business could be wiped out.”52
Moreover, changing the timing of con-
trols (i.e., instituting them in response to
macroeconomic shifts rather than using
them as an emergency maneuver) doesn’t
help to mitigate their deleterious effects on
stability. “Preventive” controls, instituted
before a country devalues its currency but
during a balance-of-payments deficit, actual-
ly accelerate capital flight. A study done in
1993 found that 70 percent of the countries
that used preventive controls experienced an
increase in capital flight.5 3
Perhaps most grating to the societies that
have to bear the burden of controls is the sim-
ple fact that the controls themselves are porous
and offer little of the benefit that is promised.
As is the case in black markets for foreign
exchange, there will inevitably be evasions of the
capital restrictions. As University of California
at Los Angeles economist Sebastian Edwards
argues: “Legal controls on capital mobility are
not always translated into actual restrictions on
these movements. In country after country the
private sector has found ways of getting around
controls.”5 4 The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development has cataloged
some of those means: falsification of invoices,
leads and lags in paperwork, substitution of
exempted flows with restricted flows, and ille-
gal methods (such as bribery and smuggling).55
In addition to those methods, perfectly legal
instruments such as derivatives have been used
to circumvent capital controls—and the longer
the controls are in place, the better the private
sector gets at avoiding them.56
To be fully effective, capital controls need
to be strong enough to impose costs and dis-
tortions on an entire economy. Empirical
work on capital controls has shown that, for
controls to be successful “in curbing capital
inflows, they need to impose very high tax
rates on foreign borrowing, and therefore
shoulder the burden of very high domestic
real interest rates.”5 7Add to that the difficul-
ty of making controls “temporary,” and
countries under capital controls find “that
the welfare benefit of capital inflow taxes . . .
are small” and “the domestic interest rate
[will] rise once the temporary shocks have
disappeared, thus offsetting the benefits
associated with smoothing the shock.”5 8
Case Study: Malaysia 
Malaysia’s experiment with capital con-
trols provides a unique opportunity to exam-
ine the effectiveness of controls in a world
that is, for the most part, liberalizing. Prime
Minister Mahathir cited volatility as the
prime reason for instituting controls in
September 1998. Claiming that “forty years
of progress should not be wrecked
overnight,” Mahathir moved to block capital
markets’ access to Malaysia and prevent
withdrawal of ringgit-denominated assets. 
The irony of Malaysia’s worries about
“hot money” is that Malaysia had historically
always had a greater proportion of FDI than
of portfolio equity in its economy (Table 2).
Unlike Korea or other countries in Asia,
Malaysia sought to liberalize its current and
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capital account in a very aggressive manner,
allowing foreign investors to participate in
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange from its
inception in 1973. Sustained economic
growth in the 1990s in the region of 8–9 per-
cent a year made Malaysia an impressive tiger
and undoubtedly drove the preponderance
of capital flows into the country. Private cap-
ital flows played a large role in Malaysia’s
economy, accounting for as much as 17.4
percent of GDP in 1993, and Malaysia
became a major recipient of FDI at the end of
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.
Indeed, because of the historical composi-
tion of capital flows to Malaysia, the country
was one of the best poised to weather the
Asian crisis (Malaysia also did not rely on
short-term debt to the extent that its neigh-
bors did). In fact, much of the short-term
debt pouring into Malaysia came late in the
game, after 1993, and the reason that
Malaysia came to rely on that debt was
twofold: First, the world market for semicon-
ductors was slowing down, leaving Malaysia
without a principal earner of foreign
exchange. Needing capital to sustain their
blistering rate of growth, many businesses
turned to the short-term market. Second,
and more important than the cyclical down-
turn, was the Malaysian insistence on “Vision
2020,” Mahathir’s grand plan, initiated in
1991, to turn Malaysia into an industrialized
nation by 2020. That placed great emphasis
on state-sponsored prestige projects, such as
highways and construction projects that
added little value to the economy as a whole
but drained resources. Financing for those
political projects was provided increasingly
by shorter-term debt, which was highly sensi-
tive to external conditions. Ironically, an
economy that had weathered a banking crisis
and attracted direct investment for most of
its history was now relying more heavily on
short-term debt—mainly because of political
interference in the markets and a misguided
philosophy of planning.
How has Malaysia actually fared since the
imposition of controls? Facing a decline in
GDP of 7.5 percent because of the crisis in
1998, Malaysia made a tentative recovery in
1999 and was projected to grow robustly into
2001 (Table 3).5 9 Malaysia’s recovery should
be attributed to several other fortuitous cir-
cumstances and policy choices made well
before the controls were instituted: the gov-
ernment was running a budget surplus at the
time of the crisis (allowing the country to use
fiscal stimuli); the savings rate in Malaysia
(34 percent of GDP) provided a domestic
source of financing for companies affected
12
Table 2
Capital Composition in Malaysia, 1983–97
Type of Capital 1983–88 1989–95 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Net private capital flowsa 3.10 8.80 11.20 15.10 17.40 1.50 8.80 9.60 4.70
Net direct investmenta 2.30 6.50 8.30 8.90 7.80 5.70 4.80 5.10 5.30
Net portfolio investmenta 0.00 0.66 5.77 1.82 2.63 4.38 -0.50
Other net investmenta 0.80 2.30 2.90 6.20 9.7 –4.2 4.10 4.50 –0.6
Net official flowsa 0.30 — 0.40 –0.1 –0.6 0.20 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Change in reservesa –1.8 –4.7 –2.6 –11.3 –17.7 4.30 2.00 –2.5 3.60
GDP growth (annual percentage) 8.60 7.80 8.35 9.24 9.46 8.58 7.84
Source: Christopher A. Hartwell, “Feeding the Tigers,” EMP-FA Policy Study, July 2000.
Note: Negative percentages represent outflows.
aAs percentage of GDP.
by capital controls; and, finally, Malaysia’s
openness to foreign trade allowed a boom in
the export sector (this development is more
precarious, given that a slowdown in the
American economy will greatly affect the
export sector, as 20 percent of Malaysia’s
exports go to the United States).60 The export
boom was also due to the fact that Malaysia
pegged its currency at 3.8 ringgits to the dol-
lar, thus effectively undervaluing its currency
in relation to others of the region.6 1
To take a longer-term view of the
Malaysian economy, it is important to note
that private consumption fueled the recovery
in 1999 and 2000, with consumption increas-
ing 8.3 percent in 2000 alone. However, little
new investment in capital or equipment has
occurred in Malaysia; the value of investment
proposals in manufacturing, the most impor-
tant sector of the economy, fell by 25.8 percent
in 1999 after declining by 45 percent in 1998.62
Coupled with the lack of investment is the
simple microeconomic reality that many of
the companies that were dangerously exposed
in the Asian crisis are under the same manage-
ment; they have not been restructured. 
Thus, attributing the recovery of Malaysia
to capital controls is erroneous, for they
probably had little or no positive effect on
Malaysia’s growth after the crisis. By the time
Malaysia imposed capital controls, the ring-
git had already depreciated by 34 percent
since the Thai baht collapsed in July 1997—
fully a year and two months after the onset of
the regional crisis.6 3By then, “the bulk of the
portfolio outflows were already over.”64
Indeed, as The Economist noted, the controls
“were applied so narrowly and imposed so
belatedly that they have had little effect,”
and, “had the controls been imposed at an
early stage in the crisis, Malaysia would now
be struggling.”6 5 Instead, the recovery in the
growth of GDP, the stock market, and
reserves that Malaysia has experienced has
also been seen in other Asian countries that
did not resort to capital controls. Moreover,
while other Asian countries have seen the
value of their currencies rebound and FDI
flows increase, Malaysia’s currency remains
pegged at an undervalued rate and the coun-
try has seen only weak flows of FDI. The
impact of the controls on short-term debt
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Table 3 
GDP Growth (percentage) and Predictions, 1998–2001
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bangladesh 5 5.2 5 4.5
China 7.8 7.1 7.5 7.3
India 6.3 6.4 6.7 6.5
Indonesia –13.0 0.3 4 5
Malaysia –7.4 5.6 6 6
Pakistan 2.6 2.7 5.6 5.3
Philippines –0.6 3.3 4 4.5
Thailand –10.2 4.2 5 5
Vietnam 3.5 4.2 4.5 5.4
Hong Kong –5.1 2.9 8 4.8
Korea –6.7 10.7 8.8 6.5
Singapore 0.4 5.4 7.9 5.9
Taiwan 4.7 5.7 6.5 6
All of Asia 4.1 5.9 6.7 6.6
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2000.
was also unimpressive. As Table 4 shows,
short-term debt hardly declined in the
Malaysian economy in absolute terms (it
declined in relative terms because of
Malaysia’s increase in reserves), while coun-
tries that did not impose capital controls
(notably Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines) saw their short-term debt
decrease in both relative and absolute terms
(Korea saw its short-term debt increase
slightly but decline in relation to its
reserves).66
If the policy course that Malaysia
embarked on in 1998 was unsustainable, it
would make sense to ensure that similar con-
trols are never imposed again. However, the
controls that remained on the Malaysian
economy until May 2001 had the same effect
on capital inflows that Malaysia’s quasi-fixed
exchange rate did: they guaranteed against
currency volatility and encouraged capital
flows that were not prohibited (which
included stocks on the Kuala Lumpur
exchange). Again, that created perverse incen-
tives and actually encouraged speculative
behavior in Malaysia, as long-term invest-
ment is still spooked by the threat of resump-
tion of controls.6 7The situation will be exac-
erbated if changes in the Malaysian real econ-
omy do not keep pace with the capital influx.
Mohamed Ariff, executive director of the
Malaysian Institute of Economic Research,
noted that “the real economy is improving,
but it’s not going by leaps and bounds to jus-
tify the kind of bull run we have in the stock
market.”6 8 Malaysia’s recovery is thus on less
than solid ground. What could it have done
differently?
Alternatives to
Capital Controls
Capital controls tend to mask the true
causes of capital crises and exacerbate the
problems that developing countries face,
rather than mitigate them. Malaysia’s case
shows this perfectly; the economy-wide dis-
tortions caused by the government before
controls were instituted have actually been
protected and perpetuated. As Shailenders
Anjaria, director of the External Relations
Department of the IMF, has said, “Given the
great benefits offered by freer international
capital markets, however, the best response
to volatile conditions is surely to strengthen
those markets’ foundations (through
improved accounting and disclosure rules,
for example) not close them down—especial-
ly since there is little evidence that the alter-
Table 4
Ratio of Short-Term Debt to Reserves, 1998 and 1999
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1998 1999
Country Short-Term Debt Reserves Ratio Short-Term Debt Reserves Ratio
Korea 41,934 51,975 0.806811 46,191 73,987 0.624312
Malaysia 10,516 25,559 0.41144 9,084 30,588 0.296979
Thailand 25,679 28,825 0.890859 16,861 34,063 0.494995
Indonesia 25,919 22,713 1.141153 21,496 26,445 0.812857
China 35,231 149,188 0.236152 24,243 157,728 0.153701
Philippines 11,912 9,226 1.291134 9,320 13,230 0.70446
Pakistan 2,620 1,028 2.548638 2,843 1,511 1.881535
Source: Bank for International Settlements and author’s calculations.
Note: Malaysia, China, and Pakistan had controls in place.
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native, stopping the flow of capital, works
well or for long.”6 9 The best alternative to
capital controls is to allow the natural adjust-
ment mechanisms to do their job, through
more openness and reform, not less.
Concentration and Competition
Capital controls often contribute to
macroeconomic sources of instability in
emerging markets, and restrictions on capital
flows are often used to help solve structural
problems, particularly in financial markets.
A major precipitant of financial crises is
unsound banking systems. To prove this
point, we need only look at the banks in
emerging markets before the Asian crisis: of
151 banks, only 11 percent were rated C+ or
better by the IMF, and none was given an A
(only free-market stalwarts Singapore and
Hong Kong had B or B+ banks).70 As Rudi
Dornbusch of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology has vociferously argued, sound
balance sheets, not the composition of capi-
tal, are the key to avoiding financial crises.
Emerging markets would do better to focus
on the need “not to be exposed to unman-
ageable risk, not to have a single event—with-
drawal cum devaluation––bring down the
financial sector like a house of cards.”71
Bank reform does not mean replication of
OECD banking systems; a few policy guide-
lines are sufficient to help reform the finan-
cial sectors of many emerging markets:
• removal of state guarantees (such as
eliminating deposit insurance), 
• privatization and deregulation, and
• making the central bank independent. 
Ending deposit insurance should be the
first step toward severing links between busi-
ness and government. Insurance for financial
intermediaries only creates moral hazard, as
government takes on the role of subsidizing
loans to risk-seeking borrowers. Furthermore,
deposit insurance and increased regulation in
emerging markets could increase the level of
corruption and cronyism in the financial sec-
tor. Banks, in many cases run by people with
close ties to or directly involved with the gov-
ernment (as is the case in Indonesia), would
under that scenario have a guarantee of sol-
vency, and regulatory institutions could easily
become another plum of cronyism, doled out
to friends or business associates of those in
power; that has indeed already been a problem
in much of the region.72
Privatization of the banking system is
thus a precondition for effective use of capi-
tal to break the stultifying control that gov-
ernments of many developing countries have
over their economies’ financial systems. Of
course, privatization will not work if there is
little competition among private banks. All
of the countries that have experienced finan-
cial crises in recent years, after all, had private
banks. But those banks were highly protect-
ed. Unfortunately, many countries continue
to have restrictions on foreign ownership of
banks or have explicit rules that deny foreign
banks access to domestic markets. Those
rules must be lifted in order both to diversify
the financial sector and to foster a climate
that will make domestic banks healthier.
Furthermore, introducing foreign banks into
developing markets results in the transfer of
technology: because international banks
have been working longer at loan extension
and due diligence, emerging-market banks
can learn from their competitors to the bene-
fit of domestic consumers.
Developing nations should also move
toward establishing independent central
banks. With independent oversight and deci-
sions about the money supply insulated from
political factors, the banking system will likely
be denied government largesse, thus produc-
ing healthier books. A trio of noted econo-
mists made a similar point in 1993: 
By imposing capital controls, these
governments raise more seigniorage
revenue and keep interest rates artifi-
cially low. As a result, public debt
accumulates at a slower rate than
otherwise. This suggests that an
institutional reform which makes
the Central Bank more independent
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makes it more difficult for the gov-
ernment to finance its budget. The
tightening of the fiscal constraint
may force the government to adjust
towards a more sound fiscal policy.73
In the end, nothing can preserve the bank-
ing system better than competition and
strengthened private ownership of financial
institutions. Policies that encourage a com-
petitive, private financial sector and an inde-
pendent central bank will help insulate
against shocks.
Exchange-Rate Policy
Financial liberalization also requires a move
to freely floating exchange rates. Indeed, pegged
exchange rates have been a major cause of the
financial crises that emerging markets have
experienced since the 1990s. Developing coun-
tries have favored pegged rates because of their
desire to maintain stable exchange rates.
Excessive volatility in the exchange rate can dis-
courage investment, as investors are worried
about losing their money overnight. That is not
a phenomenon unique to developing nations,
as even industrialized nations use various
mechanisms—such as sterilized intervention in
the foreign exchange market, which is rarely
effective—to attempt to defend their currencies
or maintain exchange rates within a set range.74
Moreover, for developing countries, large
inflows can cause a real appreciation of the
exchange rate, making domestic exports seem
less competitive. While monetary risk can be
hedged against on the international market,
international investors always must assume
some systemic risk, and this can be exacerbated
by a volatile exchange rate.
The exchange-rate regime that a nation
chooses has tremendous implications for the
management of capital flows and the likeli-
hood of a crisis. Capital flows are not a priori
the harbinger of volatility for a developing
nation; on the contrary, when countries
adopt market policies, investment in any
form is beneficial.7 5 But misunderstanding
the economic forces that underlie pegged
exchange rates can lead to a vicious cycle of
bad policy decisions. 
Pegged exchange rates often mask funda-
mental problems in an economy until those
problems become so large that domestic and
foreign investors respond to an impending
crisis. Governments typically react to the
resulting run on the currency by attempting
an expensive and usually futile defense of the
currency or, as was the case in Malaysia, by
implementing capital controls. The most
common scenario is that the market finally
forces a country either off its peg or into a
float (as recently happened, again, with
Turkey and its float of the lira).7 6 Pegged
exchange rates are the source of that instabil-
ity, while floating currencies rarely, if ever,
need to be defended. Indeed, if the ringgit
had been allowed to float, rather than
defended, the normal adjustment mecha-
nisms would have corrected the capital
account surpluses that Malaysia faced.7 7
Freely floating exchange rates also have the
benefit of avoiding contagion. Economist
Anna Schwartz notes, “Under floating
exchange rates, the economic links between
one country and others are weaker,” and thus
“we should not expect international transmis-
sion in such an exchange-rate regime.”78
Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University has made
the point that “pegged exchange regimes are
fragile in the face of adverse external shocks,”
and “self-fulfilling panics are much easier to
handle, or can be obviated entirely, by floating
exchange rate regimes.”7 9 Although both
freely floating and fully fixed exchange rates
are consistent with the free market, pegged
rates cause distortions that can lead to curren-
cy and financial rises.8 0
Conclusion
The case against capital controls rests on
sound economic reasoning. More fundamen-
tally, attempts to restrict capital movements
are an assault on individual liberty. Capital
controls betray a faith in the power of gov-
ernment, in its ability to control supply and
demand and dictate capital composition.
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They also effect a “transfer of power from cit-
izens to the state.”8 1 Nobel prize–winning
economist F. A. Hayek put it best in his clas-
sic The Road to Serfdom:
The extent of the control over all life
that economic control confers is
nowhere better illustrated than in the
field of foreign exchanges. Nothing
would at first seem to affect private
life less than a state control of the
dealings in foreign exchange, and
most people will regard its introduc-
tion with complete indifference. Yet
the experience of most Continental
countries has taught thoughtful peo-
ple to regard this step as the decisive
advance on the path to totalitarian-
ism and the suppression of individual
liberty. It is, in fact, the complete
delivery of the individual to the tyran-
ny of the state, the final suppression
of all means of escape—not merely for
the rich but for everybody.82
As Edwards has demonstrated empirical-
ly, even when controls are in place, they are
notoriously ineffective. Given the nature of
controls, the proper role for government is to
foster the conditions under which invest-
ment can flourish, through the protection of
property rights, the enforcement of con-
tracts, the establishment of stable money,
and an exchange rate consistent with market-
oriented policies. That approach is contrary
to the premise of capital controls, namely
that increased government intervention in
financial matters is necessary for a function-
ing economy. 
Nevertheless, increasing the role of gov-
ernments and international institutions is
frequently suggested as a precaution against
future financial crises, a sentiment expressed
by Paul Krugman. “It is hard to avoid con-
cluding,” Krugman has written, “that sooner
or later we will have to turn the clock at least
part of the way back. To limit capital flows
for countries that are unsuitable for either
currency unions or free floating; to re-regu-
late financial markets to some extent; and to
seek low, but not too low, inflation rather
than price stability. We must heed the lessons
of Depression economics, lest we be forced to
relearn them the hard way.”8 3
Yet liberalization seems to have won the
day in the world’s economy, for even
Malaysia’s experiment in capital controls has
ended. Indeed, a belief in managing capital
flows is as misguided as managing industrial
plans or, for that matter, the weather.84
Krugman’s calls to “turn back the clock” on
capital flows, as if that were possible without
sustained, all-powerful governments in most
nations agreeing to limit capital flows, are
not realistic. The power of international
finance will not subside quietly, and a retreat
from free-market economics can come about
only through the suppression of civil liber-
ties. Moreover, if developed nations were to
try turning back the clock, they would be
promoting policies that would keep develop-
ing nations mired in poverty.  
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